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CAPETOWN FOR EMBASSY

FROM EASUM

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, AO, US
SUBJECT: REPORT FROM LUANDA: FOUR DAYS IN FEBUARY

SUMMARY: FOLLOWING ARE SUMMARY OBSERVATIONS FROM A FOUR-DAY VISIT TO LUANDA IN EARLY FEBRUARY. THE MPLA WOULD COLLAPSE WITHOUT CUBAN ASSISTANCE, WHICH IS NOT ONLY A MILITARY NECESSITY BUT PROVIDES ESSENTIAL STAFFING FOR MAJOR ELEMENTS OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE. UNITA IS AS STRONG AS EVER, AND THE MPLA'S HOPED-FOR RECONCILIATION WITH MOBUTA HAS COLLAPSED. NAMIBIAN INDEPENDENCE UNDER SWAPO CONTROL IS SEEN BY THE MPLA AS A CRITICAL SINE QUA NON FOR A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT WITH UNITA; PENDING THAT INDEPENDENCE, THE MPLA HAS OPTED FOR A MILITARY SOLUTION. WHEREAS CUBANS ARE BOTH CURSED AND PRAISED, THE SOVIETS AND EAST EUROPEANS ARE VILLIFIED MORE CONSISTENTLY. UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, HOWEVER, THE MPLA HAS NO VIABLE ALTERNATIVES TO HEAVY RELIANCE ON COMMUNIST AID. THE MORE LIBERAL WING OF THE PARTY IS OFTEN OBLIGED TO GIVE IN TO THE MORE DOCTRINAIRE SOVIET WING. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE OIL SECTOR, WHERE PRODUCTION OF PREMIUM LIGHT CRUDE IS ON THE INCREASE AND FOREIGN COMPANIES ARE WELCOME, THE ANGOLAN ECONOMY IS A SHAMBLES. THE BULGARIANS AND THE CUBANS HAVE BEEN GIVEN MAJOR RESPONSIBILITIES IN AGRICULTURE BUT ARE FINDING IT TOUGH GOING. BOEING AIRCRAFT RECENTLY SOLD A THIRD 737 TO ANGOLA AIRWAYS AND IS EMBARKED ON A LUCRATIVE \$17 MILLION CONTRACT TO INSTALL AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL EQUIPMENT AT SIX MAJOR LOCATIONS. THE ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT REMAINS KEENLY INTERESTED IN NORMALIZING RELATIONS WITH THE US. IT WOULD ACCEPT NO PRE-CONDITIONS. THERE IS STRONG FEELING AMONG DIPLOMATIC CORPS REPRESENTATIVES IN LUANDA AND EUROPEAN BUSINESS REPRESENTATIVES

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THAT NORMALIZED RELATIONS WOULD PROVIDE AN IMPORTANT ADDITIONAL WINDOW TO THE WEST FOR A REGIME THAT MAY OTHERWISE BECOME MORE FIRMLY FROZEN IN ITS PRO-SOVIET INCLINATIONS. I FOUND INFORMATION IN LUANDA RELATIVELY EASY TO OBTAIN AND WOULD SUGGEST THAT THE DEPARTMENT MAY WISH TO CONSIDER PERIODIC INFORMATIONAL VISITS.

END SUMMARY

1. ELUSIVE TRUTH

ANY REPORT ON CONTEMPORARY ANGOLA BASED ON A MERE FOUR DAYS EXPOSURE TO LUANDA MUST BE VIEWED WITH CONSIDERABLE RESERVE. SUBJECTED TO CONSTANT IDEOLOGICAL BOMBARDMENT BY PRESS AND RADIO/TV, WOODED BY SPECIAL PLEADERS OR WESTED INTERESTS, HARANGUED BY THOSE WHOSE EXPERIENCES HAVE TRAUMATIZED THEIR BETTER JUDGMENTS, AND TREATED WITH SUSPICION BY THE AVERAGE ANGOLAN FUNCTIONARY, THE SHORT-TIME AMERICAN VISITOR COMES AWAY WITH A KALEIDOSCOPIC ASSORTMENT OF IMPRESSIONS DIFFICULT TO EVALUATE AND RISKY TO SYNTHESIZE. IN VIEW OF OUR APPARENT PAUCITY OF INFORMATION ON CURRENT CONDITIONS IN ANGOLA, HOWEVER, IT MAY BE USEFUL FOR ME TO RECORD AS BEST I CAN THE PRINCIPAL THINGS I WAS TOLD AND THE MAJOR IMPRESSIONS I FORMED.

(SEPERATE TELEGRAMS HAVE REPORTED ON ANGOLAN ATTITUTDES

TOWARD THE NAMIBIAN PROBLEM AND ON PRESIDENT NETO'S RESPONSE
TO THE WESTERN FIVE PROPOSAL. SEE USUN 427, PARIS 4057,
AND LAGOS 1780.)

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CAPETOWN FOR EMBASSY

FROM EASUM

2. MPLA BARELY ABOVE WATER.

WITH UNITA STILL STRONGLY ENTRENCHED SOUTH OF THE BENGUELA RAILWAY AND WITH THE FNLA STILL ACTIVE ALONG THE NORTHERN BORDER, NEARLY HALF THE COUNTRYSIDE ELUDES MPLA CONTROL. PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IS A SHAMBLES, AND THE ECONOMY IS IN A STATE OF SHOCK. IDEOLOGICAL EXHORTATION OF DESPERATE INTENSITY SEEMS TO FALL ON DEAF POPULAR EARS, NEITHER COMPENSATING FOR NOR REMEDYING ROOT CAUSES OF THE MASSIVE SHORTFALL IN ACHIEVEMENT OF THE REVOLUTIONS OBJECTIVES. FEBRUARY 4 HEROES' DAY BETRAYED VACANT STREETS AND ROW AFTER ROW OF EMPTY SEATS AT CEREMONIES THAT WERE DESIGNED TO DEMONSTRATE POPULAR SUPPORT FOR THE REGIME BUT SEEM TO HAVE DONE JUST THE OPPOSITE. MPLA ATTACKS ON THE CLERGY AND CLOSURE OF A CATHOLIC RADIO STATION PRODUCED SUCH BACKLASH THAT LUCIO LARA'S FEBRUARY 4 SPEECH CONTAINED AN OLIVE BRANCH.

3. UNITA

UNITA IS WELL ESTABLISHED AT THREE STRONG POINTS ALONG OR NEAR THE BENGUELA RAILWAY LINE: HUANBO, LUENA AND CAZOMBO. IT IS IN A POSITION TO INTERDICT MPLA ADMINISTRATION THROUGH MUCH OF THE ANGOLAN 'BREADBASKET' COUNTRYSIDE SOUTH OF THOSE STRONG POINTS AND ALL THE WAY DOWN TO THE BORDER WITH NAMIBIA. MPLA OFFICIALS WERE PERSUADED THAT UNITA IS SUPPORTED FROM THE SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY BASE AT GROOTFONTEIN, WITH A MAJOR SUPPLY LINE RUNNING ALONG THE CUBONGO RIVER BORDER OF NAMIBIA AND ANGOLA. WHEREAS MOCAMEDES IS FIRMLY UNDER FMPLA/CUBAN CONTROL (THE CITY IS SAID TO BE SWARMING WITH CUBAN SOLDIERS), TRAVEL OUTSIDE THE CITY IS DANGEROUS. THE DRIVE FROM LUANDA TO QUIBALA IS SAFE, BUT FROM QUIBALA TO LOBITO REQUIRES

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CONVOY PROTECTION WHETHER VIA NOVA REDONDO OR VIA NORTON DE MATOS. THE FAPLA/CUBAN ARMY CANNOT DEFEAT UNITA ON THE GROUND. A MAJOR HEAVY-ARMOR EFFORT IN SEPTEMBER FAILED. UNITA FORCES SIMPLY MELTED INTO THE BUSH, TO COME BACK OUT AGAIN AFTER THE ARMOR HAD PASSED.

4. IMPORTANCE OF NAMIBIAN INDEPENDENCE

THE MPLA REGIME VIEWS NAMIBIAN INDEPENDENCE UNDER SWAPO OR SIMILARLY 'FRIENDLY' AEGIS AS A CRITICAL NECESSITY FOR ANGOLAN NATIONAL UNITY, AS INTERDICTION

OF SUPPORT NOW BEING PROVIDED FROM NAMIBIA IS SEEN AS THE ONLY WAY TO BREAK UNITA'S HOLD ON THE SOUTH. IN ANTICIPATION OF NAMIBIAN INDEPENDENCE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FIGHT AGAINST UNITA, THE MPLA HAS CONSCIOUSLY DECIDED TO STICK WITH THE MILITARY OPTION IN SPITE OF ITS PRESENT STALEMATE RATHER THAN CONSIDER A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT WITH UNITA. THIS CRITICAL IMPORTANCE OF NAMIBIAN INDEPENDENCE FOR MPLA OBJECTIVES AND FOR ITS DESIRE TO CUT BACK ITS DEPENDENCY ON CUBAN FORCES WAS THE MAJOR FACTOR BEHIND THE CORDIALITY AND SERIOUS ATTENTION THAT NETO AND JORGE BESTOWED ON THE WESTERN FIVE PROPOSAL FOR NAMIBIA, PRESENTED TO THEM IN LUANDA FEBRUARY 4-8. PERHAPS IN SIMILAR ANTICIPATION OF THE EFFECTS OF UPCOMING NAMIBIAN INDEPENDENCE, UNITA IN RECENT DAYS APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN MORE ACTIVE-PERHAPS TO IMPROVE ITS POSITION IN ANY EVENTUAL POLITICAL BARGAINING. SOME SUGGEST IN ADDITION THAT UNITA MAY HAVE TAKEN HEART FROM REPORTED TRANSFERS OF SUBSTANTIAL CUBAN CONTINGENTS FROM ANGOLA TO ETHIOPIA.

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CAPETOWN FOR EMBASSY

FROM EASUM

5. FNLA

FNLA UNITS ARE ACTIVE ALONG THE NORTHERN BORDER AND IN THE VICINITY OF ASBORIZ AND AMBRIZETE. THEY ARE SIMILARLY EFFECIVE ALONG WITH FLHC, IN CUBINDA (ESPECIALLY IN THE NORTH) WHERE SIGNIFICANT CUBAN CASUALTIES HAVE RECETNLY BEEN RELIABLY REPORTED. ANGOLAN RECONCILIATION WITH MOBUTU WAS SHORT-LIVED. AT THE MEETING WITH ZAIRE OFFICIALS IN JANUARY IN BRAZAVILLE TO DISCUSS NORMALIZED RELATIONS, THE ANGOLANS PRESENTED DETAILS, INCLUDING MAPS, ON FNLA AND FLEC INCURSIONS AND BASIS. ZAIRE 'DENIED EVERYTHING,' ACCORDING TO THE MPLA, AND THE DISCUSSIONS WERE BROKEN OFF. THE MPLA IS ALSO BITTER ABOUT MOBUTU BEING SO PROMINENTLY ACCOMPANIED BY HOLDEN ROBERTO DURING RECENT TRAVELS IN EUROPE.

6. THE CUBAN PRESENCE.

IT IS COMMON BELIEF AMONG QUALIFIED OBSERVERS IN LUANDA THAT THE MPLA REGIME WOULD QUICKLY FALL WITHOUT THE CUBAN PRESENCE. ENTIRE MINISTRIES ARE RUN VIRTUALLY FROM TOP TO BOTTOM BY CUBAN CIVILIANS. THESE INCLUDE HOUSING, .TRANS-PORTATION, FINANCE, FOREIGN TRADE, CONSTRUCTION, HELATH, AND EDUCATION. IN CERTAIN CASES, CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS HAVE BEEN ASSIGNED IN TOTO TO CUBAN PLANNERS, DESIGNERS, ARCHITECTS, AND ORDINARY LABORERS. CUBAN CONTRIBUTIONS IN THE HEALTH FIELD HAVE BEEN ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT. THERE ARE MORE CUBAN DOCTORS CURRENTLY IN ANGOLA THAN THE TOTAL NUMBER OF DOCTORS OF OTHER NATIONALITES. THE NUMBER OF CUBAN DOCTORS IS ESTIMATED AT BETWEEN 115 AND 150, WHEREAS THERE ARE REPORTED TO BE SOME 50 PORTUGUESE DOCTORS AND A TOTAL OF PERHAPS ONLY 50

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OTHERS. ESTIMATES ON THE SIZE OF THE CUBAN PRESENCE RUN ANYWHERE FROM 15,000 TO 40, 000 SOLDIERS AND 2,000 TN 5,000 CIVILIAN TECHNICIANS AND LABORERS. IT REMAINS DIFFICULT TO ASSESS THE EXTENT TO WHICH CUBAN TROOPS ACTUALLY PARTICIPATE IN DIRECT COMBAT AGAINST UNITA OR FNLA FORCES. THE FIRST LINE OF DEFENSE AGAINST UNITA AND FNLA IS SAID TO BE THE 'LOCAL DEFENSE FORCES' (MILITIA OR HOME GUARD?). THEN FAPLA MOVES INTO ACTION, WITH CUBAN TROOPS PROVIDING LOGISTICAL AND OTHER SUPPORT BUT BEING HELD OUT FROM COMBAT UNLESS ABSOLUTELY REQUIRED.

7. RUSSIANS AND EAST EUROPEANS

--THE NEXT LARGEST FOREIGN PRESENCE AFTER THE CUBANS IS THE RUSSIANS. THEIR NUMBERS ARE VARIOUSLY REPORTED TO BE BETWEEN 750 AND 1500. EXCEPT FOR SPECIAL ASSIGNMENTS IN COMMUNICATIONS (E.G., 'BUGGING' ALL DIPLOMATS' TELEPHONES), THEY ARE BELIEVED TO BE ASSIGNED ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY TO THE ANGOLAN ARMED FORCES, SERVING AS TRAINERS, TECHNICIANS, OR ADVISORS IN CONNECTION WITH THE UTILIZATION OF SOVIET ARMOR AND OTHER MILITARY EQUIPMENT PROVIDED TO THE FAPLA FORCES. SOVIET MILITARY PERSONNEL WEAR THE SAME OLIVE GREEN UNIFORMS WORN BY THE CUBANS BUT ARE NOT READILY MISTAKEN. THERE ARE A FEW ISOLATED SOVIET TECHNICIANS IN CIVILIAN SECTORS; ONE RUSSIAN DOCTOR WAS REPORTEDLY PAID \$5000 A MONTH PLUS HOUSING FOR A BRIEF ASSIGNMENT, MUCH TO THE DISGUST OF OTHER LESS WELL PAID FOREIGN ADVISORS.

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CAPETOWN FOR EMBASSY

FROM EASUM

---NEXT IN LINE ARE THE BULGARIANS. PRESIDENT NETO RECENTLY
ANNOUNCED A CEILING OF 1,000 BULGARINA ADVISORS AND
TECHNICIANSBUT LESS THAN HALF THAT NUMBER ARE BELIEVED TO
HAVE ARRIVED. AGRICULTURE, INCLUDING STAFFING OF IMPORTANT
LEVELS OF THE MINISTRY, IS RESERVED FOR THE BULGARIANS.
SUGAR AND COFFE, HOWEVER, HAVE BEEN ASSIGNED TO THE CUBANS.
--THERE ARE PERHAPS A THOUSAND ADDITIONAL TECHNICIANS FROM
SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, PARTICULARLY CZECHOSLOVAKIA, NORTH KOREA
(IN TEXTILES), HUNGARY AND EAST GERMANY.
--THE ANGOLAN BUDGET IS GRADUALLY PICKING UP THE SALARIES
OF ALL FOREIGN TECHNICIANS BUT ONLY AT VERY MODEST LEVELS.
CUBANS APPARENTLY ARE PAID LESS THAN SOVIETS AND EAST
EUROPEANS. EAST EUROPEAN AMBASSADORS IN LUANDA HAVE
COMMENTED THAT THEIR EXPORTS ARE NONE BOURGEOIS THAN THEIR
CUBAN COUNTERPARTS AND WOULD BE UNWILLING TO COME TO A
PLACE LIKE ANGOLA IN SUCH NUMBERS OR AT SUCH LOW PAY. SOVIET
AND EAST EUROPEAN EXPERTS ARE OFTEN ASSIGNED FOR ONLY SEVERAL

MONTHS AT A TIME, WHEREAS THE CUBANS APPEAR TO HAVE MUCH LONGER TOURS OF DUTY. IT IS WIDELY RECOGNIZED THAT THE CUBANS ARE THUS PERFORMING A UNIQUE SERVICE THAT NO ONE ELSE WOULD BE WILLING OR ABLE TO PROVIDE--EXCEPT PERHAPS THE PORTUGUESE, A POSSIBILITY RULED OUT BY THE CONTINUING STRAIN IN THE ANGOLAN/PORTUGUESE RELATIONSHIP.

--THE CUBANS ARE BOTH PRAISED AND CRITICIZED WHEREAS THE SOVIETS AND THE BLOC COUNTRIES ARE ALMOST UNIVERSALLY BAD-MOUTHED. STILL CIRCULATING IS A NASTY STORY, APPARENTLY PRETTY MUCH DISCREDITED, TO THE EFFECT THAT THE CUBANS WERE ACTIVELY BEHIND NITO ALVES' COUP ATTEMPT LAST APRIL. THEY 'SAVED' NETO SO THE STORY GOES, ONLY WHEN THEY SAW ALVES

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WASN'T GOING TO SUCCEED. OTHER STORIES RELATE THEFT OF ANGOLAN VEHICLES AND SHIPMENT TO CUBA IN SOVIET AIRCRAFT. WHEREASTHERE ARE OCCASIONAL REPORTS OF CUBAN PILLAGE OF VILLAGES, MASSACRE OF INNOCENT CIVILIANS, OR RAPE OF WOMEN, IT IS MORE OFTEN SAID THAT CUBAN SOLDIERS ARE WELL DISCIPLINED AND AT ANY RATE KEEP PRETTY MUCH TO THEMSELVES. A LONG-TIME PORTUGUESE RESIDENT TOLD ME THE CUBANS IN ANGOLA WERE INSOLENT AND IN FACT RACIST TOWARD BLACKS, BUT OTHER OBSERVERS SPOKE OF CUBANS' EMPATHY DERIVED FROM RACIAL AND LANGUAGE AFFINITIES. IT IS APPARENTLY EASIER FOR A CUBAN TO CONVERSE WITH AN ANGOLAN THAN FOR A SPANIARD FROM MADRID TO GET ON WITH A PORTUGUESE FROM LISBON.

8. RELATIONS WITH PORTUGAL

--ANGOLAN RELATIONS WITH PORTUGAL ARE STILL UNEASY. PORTUGUESE AMBASSADOR SA COUTINBO (WHO HAS BEEN LIVING IN A HOTEL FOR THE PAST YEAR BECAUSE THE ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT COULDN'T OR WOULDN'T FIND HIM ANYTHING BETTER) IS PARTICULARLY BITTER ABOUT RECENT LEGISLATION THAT RESTRICTS FOREIGN TRAVEL BY ANGOLANS TO ONE TRIP IN THREE YEARS. THE ONLY EXCEPTIONS ARE MEDICAL OR IMMEDIATE-FAMILY EMERGENCIES. IN THE FORMER CASE, APPROVAL MUST BE OBTAINED FROM A MEDICAL REVIEW BOARD WHICH TAKES A LONG TIME TO MAKE ITS DECISION. AT ANY RATE VERY FEW AUTHORIZATIONS ARE APPROVED. ALTHOUGH THESE TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS ARE NOT COUNTRY-SPECIFIC, THE PORTUGUESE AMBASSADOR BELIEVES THEY ARE VERY CLEARLY DIRECTED AGAINST PORTUGAL AND ARE MOTIVATED AS MUCH BY ANTI-PORTUGUESE POLITICAL ANIMUS AS BY FOREIGN EXCHANGE CONSIDERATIONS.

9. MPLA POLITICS.

--AMBASSADOR SA CONTINHO SAYS THERE IS A DISCERNIBLE SPLIT WITHIN THE TOP RANKS OF THE MPLA. HE VIEWS THE PRIME MINISTER AND HIS TWO PRINCIPAL DEPUTIES, AND ESPECIALLY FORMER FOREIGN MINISTER EDUARDO SANTOS, AS FIRMLY PRO-USSR. THE THIRD DEPUTY, VAN DUNEN, IS FAR LESS DOCTRINAIRE, AS ARE THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE AND FOREIGN

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MINISTER JORGE. 'UNFORTUNATELY,' ACCORDING TO MANY
WESTERN AMBASSADORS IN LUANDA, JORGE IS ONLY A SECOND-RANK
MEMBER OF THE POLITBURO. NETO'S SYMPATHIES ARE SAID TO
BE MORE WITH THE LIBERAL WING OF THE PARTY ELITE THAN
WITH THE HARDLINE PRO-SOVIET GROUP, BUT HE IS OFTEN
OBLIGED TO COMPROMISE HIS PERSONAL VIEWS IN DEFERENCE TO THE
MILITANTS.

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CAPETOWN FOR EMBASSY

FROM EASUM

9. ANGOLAN/US RELATIONS.

--ITALIAN AMBASSADOR GEORGIO VECCHI TOLD ME THAT FOUR AMBASSADORS HAD ON SEPARATE OCCASIONS AND WITHOUT COLLUSION PRESSED HIM TO URGE THE U.S. TO TAKE A FRESH LOOK AT THE QUESTION OF NORMALIZING ITS RELATIONS WITH ANGOLA. THE FOUR EMBASSIES WERE YUGOSLAVIA, ROMANIA, NIGERIA, AND GUINEA. IT WAS TO VECCHI THAT THEY MADE THEIR PITCHES BECAUSE OF HIS UNOFFICIAL ROLE IN WATCHING OVER U.S. INTERESTS IN ANGOLA AND BECAUSE HE IS KNOWN TO BE A FRIEND OF THE U.S. THERE WAS A COMMON THREAD IN EACH PRESENTATION, I.E., THAT WITHOUT ACCESS TO A BROADER ARRAY OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE OPTIONS AND FOREIGN POLICY ALTERNATIVES, ANGOLA WOULD BECOME FROZEN IN ITS RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE BLOC, SIMILAR ARGUMENTS WERE PRESENTED TO ME BY PORTUGUESE REPRESENTATIVES OF AMERICAN OIL COMPANIES, AS WELL AS BY THE AMBASSADORS OR CHARGES' OF PORTUGAL, NIGERIA, BRAZIL, DENMARK, SWEDEN, THE NETHERLANDS, THE UNITED KINGDOM AND FRANCE.

--AMBASSADOR VECCHI VISITED THE TWO JAILED AMERICAN 'MERCENARIES' TWICE LAST YEAR. THE LAST VISIT WAS DECEMBER 31. HE SAYS THEY ARE NOT BEING MISTREATED. HE IS TRYING TO MAKE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THEM TO GET BETTER MAIL SERVICE. RIGID CENSORSHIP OF LETTERS IN BOTH DIRECTIONS COMPLICATES THE PROCEDURE. THE CASE OF BEGINOLD GAUSS HAS BEEN SOMEWHAT MORE DIFFICULT FOR VECCHI. GAUSS IS A FORMER CABINDA-GULF EMPLOYEE WHO RESIGNED TO JOIN THE ANGOLAN MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE. HE WAS ARRESTED LAST SUMMER FOR SMUGGLING OF ARMS, ALTHOUGH VECCHI BELIEVES THE WEAPONS IN QUESTION MAY HAVE BEEN SIMPLY IMPORTED FOR HUNTING. HE HAS TRIED SEVERAL TIMES WITHOUT SUCCESS TO OBTAIN INFORMATION ABOUT THE CASE FROM

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THE MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AND TO OBTAIN PERMISSION TO

VISIT GAUSS. HE SAYS THE MINISTRY HAS DIFFICULTY GETTING INFORMATION FROM THE MILITARY AUTHORITIES AND PARTICULARLY FROM OFFICIALS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERNAL SECURITY.

--PRIOR TO THE ARRIVAL IN LATE JANUARY OF THE NEW BRITISH CHARGE, JOHN FLYNN, VECCHI HAD RESPONSIBILITY FOR VISITING THE BRITISH MERCENARIES AS WELL AS THE AMERICANS. HE AND FLYNN BELIEVE IT IS PREFERABLE THAT HE MAINTAIN THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR VISITING THE AMERICANS, THUS IN EFFECT DOUBLING ESTERN DIPLOMATIC ACCESS TO THEANGOLAN SECURITY AND PRISON APPARATUS AND MAXIMIZING OPPORTUNITIES FOR INFORMATION ON THE WELFARE OF THESE DETAINED INDIVIDUALS. THIS DECISION APPEARE EMINANTLY REASONABLE; I WOULD SUGGEST THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT ASK THE ITALIAN FOREIGN OFFICE TO INFORM VECCHI THAT WE CONCUR AND THAT WE LOOK FORWARD TO HIS CONTINUING GOOD EFFORTS.

--GIVEN THE REMARKABLE AMOUNT OF TIME AND CAREFUL ATTENTION THAT PRESIDENT NETO AND FOREIGN MINISTER JORGE DEVOTED TO OUR PRESENTATION OF THE WESTERN FIVE PROPOSAL ON NAMIBIA, I FOUND NO APPROPRIATE OCCASION FOR DISCUSSION OF BILATERAL MATTERS. I DOUBT THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN MUCH MERIT IN SUCH CONVERSATION ANYWAY, GIVEN THE FULLNESS OF THE DISCUSSION DON MCHENRY HAD WITH JORGE LAST NOVEMBER AND THE FACT THAT THE POSITIONS OF NEITHER SIDE APPEAR TO HAVE CHANGED SINCE THEN. IN A BRIEF REFERENCE TO THE ISSUE AS WE SAID GOOD-BYE FOLLOWING OUR SECOND CONVERSATION FEBRUARY6, NETO SAID TO ME 'WE ARE READY FOR YOU WHENEVER YOU ARE READY FOR US.' IT IS CLEAR HE WILL ACCEPT NO PRECONDITIONS. AS IMPLIED ABOVE, MPLA AND THE CUBANS ARE EACH OTHER'S CAPTIVES. NEITHER SIDE ENJOYS IT, BUT NEITHER SIDE CAN GET LOOSE. THERE MAY WELL BE NO POSSIBILITY OF CHANGE IN THIS PUSH-ME-PULL-YOU RELATIONSHIP UNTIL INDEPENDENCE IN NAMIBIA.

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CAPETOWN FOR EMBASSY

FROM EASUM

10. DIPLOMATIC CORPS
WHILE HALF OF THE 32 DIPLOMATIC ESTABLISHMENTS
REPRESENTED IN LUANDA COULD BE CONSIDERED TO REPRESENT
SOCIALIST OR COMMUNIST COUNTRIES, THE WEST IS SUB-
STANTIALLY REPRESENTED (AUSTRIA, BELGIUM, BRAZIL, DENMARK,
GREAT BRITAIN, ITALY, THE NETHERLANDS, SWEDEN, SWITZERLAND).
OTHER REPRESENTATIONS INCLUDE ZAMBIA, NIGERIA, GHANA, GABON
AND EGYPT. WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES DO NOT APPEAR TO FARE
ANY WORSE THAN THEIR 'PROGRESSIVE' COLLEAGUES IN THEIR
DEALINGS WITH THE ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT. THEY ARE
UNANIMOUS IN THEIR PRAISE OF FOREIGN MINISTER PAULO JORGE.
NINE OF THE 32 EMBASSIES REPORT THAT THEIR CHIEFS OF
MISSION WERE ON LEAVE OR ILL. NIGERIAN AMBASSADOR MUSA BELLO
PROUDLY TOLD ME HE HAD VISITED LAGOS 26 TIMES IN TWO YEARS.
IN AMNY CASES AMBASSADORIAL RESIDENCES ARE INFINITELY
MORE PLEASANT THAN THE EMBASSY OFFICES (PARTICULARLY IF
THE RESIDENCE IS IN THE MIRE-MAR 'HIGH RENT' DISTRICT),
WITH THE RESULT THAT THE AMBASSADOR NEVET GOES TO THE

OFFICE. DIPLOMAT CORPS DEAN IS CONGOLESE AMBASSADOR
BENJAMIN BOUNKOWLOU.

11. ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES.

--THE PETROLEUM SECTOR APPEARS TO BE THE ONLY EXCEPTION
TO A GENERALLY DISMAL ECONOMIC PICTURE. PROTECTED BY
SIZABLE CONTINGENTS OF CUBAN TROOPS, CABINDA-GULF IS PRO-
DUCING AT PERHPS 180,000 BARRELS A DAY (LIGHT SWEET CRUDE).
THIS IS PERHAPS ITS HIGHEST-EVER PRODUCTION FIGURE. TEXACO
IS ABOUT TO SIGN A NEW CONTRACT PROVIDING FOR PRODUCTION
INCREASES TO 35,000 BARRELS A DAY FROM FIELDS BOTH ON AND
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OFF SHORE JUST SOUTH OF THE CONGO RIVER MOUTH. TEXACO MIGHT
REACH 50,000 BARRELS NEXT YEAR WITH THE ARRIVAL LATER THIS
YEAR OF A NEW DRILLING RIG AND FOUR BOATS. IN ADDITION,
OLDER WELLS WILL BE REPRESSURIZED. TEXACO HAS A SHARED
OWNERSHIP ARRANGEMENT WITH PETROFINA OF BELGIUM. OTHER
PRODUCTION IN WATERS SOUTH OF LAUNDA ADDS PERHAPS 25,000
BARRELS A DAY, THUS GIVING ANGOLA A TOTAL PRODUCTION OF
APPROXIMATELY 1/4 MILLION BARRELS A DAY. THIS PRODUCTION
PRODUCES A CURRENT INCOME ROUGHTLY CALCULATED AT 900 MILLION
DOLLARS A YEAR. MOBIL HOPES SOON TO SIGN A CONTRACT FOR
DEEP WATER DRILLING OFF CABINDA IN COLLABORATION WITH GULF
AND POSSIBLY WITH AGIP. THE THIRD PARTNER WAS ORIGINALLY
TO HAVE BEEN ELF BUT THE ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT
ACCEPT THEM BECAUSE OF ALLEGED FRENCH AID TO UNITA.
--MOBIL AND TEXACO EXECUTIVES FAMILIAR WITH THE NIGERIAN
OIL SCENE TOLD ME THEY FIND IT EASIER TO WORK IN ANGOLA.
ALTHOUGH SOMEWHAT APPREHENSIVE ABOUT THE TERMS OF THE NEW
PETROLEUM LAW WHOSE PUBLICATION IS NOW EXPECTED WITHIN A
MATTER OF WEEKS, FOREIGN OIL COMPANIES GENERALLY ENJOY A
MORE COMFORTABLE ENVIRONMENT THAN THEIR COUNTERPARTS IN
NIGERIA. FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS (16 2/3 PERCENT ROYALTY,
65.75 PERCENT TAX) ARE MORE LIBERAL WHEREAS POSTED AND SALES PRICES
ARE TIED TO NIGERIAN PRICES BUT ARE SOMEWHAT MORE FAVORABLE.
THE INDIGENIZATION ISSUE IS SIMILARLY LESS DIFFICULT. THE
PORTUGUESE DID FAR LESS TO TRAIN PETROLEUM TECHNICIANS AND
TO PRODUCE AN EDUCATED ELITE THAN DID THE BRITISH IN
NIGERIA. THUS THE ANGOLANS READILY RECOGNIZE AND ADMIT
THEIR NEED FOR FOREIGN EXPERTISE. THE PRESSURES TO
INDIGENIZE ARE FAR LESS AT THE MOMENT, ALTHOUGH FOREIGN
COMAPNIES ARE NOT SANGUINE THAT THESE PRESSURES WILL NOT
COME IN DUE COURSE.

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AMEMBASSY DAKAR
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY GABORONE
USINT HAVANA
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CAPETOWN FOR EMBASSY

FROM EASUM

--THE AGRICULTURAL SIDE OF THE ECONOMY IS IN SHAMBLES.

COFFEE PLANTATIONS UNTENDED THROUGHOUT THE WAR HAVE
CIRTUALLY CEASED PRODUCTION. THE CUBANS HAVE A TARGET OF
RESTORING COFFEE PRODUCTION TO AROUND 1/6 OF PRE-WAR LEVELS BUT
MAY SUCCEED IN RAISING IT UP TO ONLY ABOUT 10 PERCENT. THE
POTENTIAL IMPORTANCE OF COFFEE AS A MONEY EARNER IS SEEN FROM
THE FACT THAT

AT CURRENT COFFEE PRICES, THE PRE-WAR HARVEST
OF ANGOLA WOULD PRODUCE AS MUCH MONEY AS CURRENT
PETROLEUM PRODUCTION.

-- SHIPS REACHING LUANDA PORT ARE DELAYED THREE MONTHS IN
UNLOADING. IMPORTED FOOD AND OTHER IMPORTED MERCHANDISE
ARE VIRTUALLY NON-EXISTANT ANYWAY, GIVEN THE DEPARTURE OF
VIRTUALLY THE ENTIRE COMMERCIAL CLASS. TRANSPORTATION AND
MARKETING ARRANGEMENTS FOR INDIGENOUS FOOD PRODUCTION DO NOT
EXIST. THERE IS HARDLY A SINGLE OPERATING STORE, MARKET OR SHOP TO
BE FOUND IN DOWNTOWN LUANDA. ONE SEES BLOCK AFTER BLOCK OF
DESERTED SHOPS WITH BOARDED WINDOWS. ON THOSE RARE DAYS WHENONE
OF THE FEW REMAINING MERCHANTS RECEIVES A SHIPMENT OF IMPORTED
GOODS, HIS STORE ATTRACTS LONG LINES OF PURCHASERS MANY OF WHOM
WILL THEN PROCEED TO BARTER WHAT THEY HAVE BOUGHT FOR OTHER
COMMODITIES, PARTICULARLY FRESH FOKD. IT IS SAD THAT A NEW
SHIRT OR A PAIR OF SHOES CAN BE TRADED IN THE COUNTRYSIDE
OUTSIDE LUANDA FOR TWO GOATS.

--TAXI SERVICE DISAPPEARED FROM TOWN WHEN THE DRIVERS ALL
WENT HOME TO PORTUGAL. RESTAURANTS HAVE CIRTUALLY DISAPPEARED,
AND SERVICE IN THE HOTELS IS VIRTUALLY NON-EXISTENT. FOR TWO
WEEKS LAST YEAR ALL RESIDENTS OF THE GOVERNMENT-OWNED
PANORAMA HOTEL, THE BEST IN TOWN, WERE OBLIED TO FIND OTHER
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ROOMS WHILE THE HOTEL MANAGEMENT CONDUCTED AN ALL-OUT ATTACK
AGAINST COCKROACHES AND RATS. VISITING BUSINESSMEN AND
RESIDENT DIPLOMATS LODGED IN THE HOTELS TELL STORES ABOUT
WEEK AFTER WEEK OF HOTEL MENUS LIMITED TO FISH AND RICE.
ALL GUESTS NOW REGISTERING AT THE PANORAMA ARE GIVEN A NOTICE
WHICH READS 'DUE TO OUR DIFFICULTIES WE BEG YOU TO AVOID
INVITATIONS TO THE RESTAURANTS.'

13. BOEING BRIGHT SPOT

--A BRIGHT SPOT ON THIS SCENE IS THE ACTIVITY OF BOEING
(SEATTLE), NOW WORKING ON A 17 MILLION DOLLAR CONTRACT TO
INSTALL AIR-TRAFFIC CONTROL EQUIPMENT AT SIX MAJOR
LOCATIONS IN ANGOLA. EQUIPMENT HAS BEEN INSTALLED OVER THE
PAST YEAR WITHOUT INCIDENT AT UCABINDA, LUANDA, AND
MOCAMEDES. THE INSTALLATION AT THE AIRFIELD AT RUAMBO HAD
TO BE MADE UNDER HEAVY ARMED GUARD DUE TO UNITA ACTIVITIES
IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD. AN INSTALLATION IS PLANNED FOR LUSO
BUT CANNOT MOVE AHEAD UNTIL UNITA TROOPS ARE PUSHED OUT OF
THE AREA. A SIXTH INSTALLATION IS TO BE MADE AT CATUMBELA,
BUT THIS HAS BEEN DELAYED FOR UNSPECIFIED REASONS. EIGHT

BOEING TECHNICIANS ARE INVOLVED IN THIS PROJECT. THEY
GENERALLY SPEND SIX WEEKS IN ANGOLA AND THEN A MONTH IN THE
U.S. THE PERIOD OF ROTATIONAL ASSIGNMENT USED TO BE 10
WEEKS BUT THIS PROVED TOO ARDUOUS FOR THE PERSONNEL.
--A THIRD BOEING 737 WAS RECENTLY PURCHASED BY ANGOLA
AIRWAHS. THE CONTRACT HAD BEEN HELD UP FOR TWO MONTHS
WHILE THE POLITBURO QUESTIONED IT ON IDEOLOGICAL GROUNDS.
THE MINISTER OF CIVIL AVIATION MADE A DIRECT APPEAL TO
NETO ON THE EVE OF HIS DEPARTURE FOR HIS RECENT TRIP
TO NIGERIA. NETO MADE A UNILATERAL DECISION IN FAVOR OF
THE PURCHASE. HIS DECISION WAS REPORTEDLY INFLUENCED BY
HIS PERSONAL BELIEF THAT RUSSIAN AIRCRAFT SOLD TO ANGOLA
HAD BEEN 'A DISASTER.' HE PERSONALLY REFUSED TO FLY ANY
RUSSIAN PLANE. THE YAK, FOR EXAMPLE, IS CRITICISED AROUND
HOTEL BARS AS LOSING 60 PERCENT OF ITS EFFICIENCY WHEN IT FLIES OUT
OF RUMABO, WHICH IS AT 5500 FEET ALTITUDE. RUSSIAN AIRCRAFT
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ARE SAID TO BE INAPPROPRIATE FOR ANGOLAN CONDITIONS.

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AMEMBASSY DAKAR
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USINT HAVANA
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CAPETOWN FOR EMBASSY

FROM EASUM

14. INFORMATION-GATHERING VISITS TO LUANDA.
I FOUND LUANDA TO BE A MORE OPEN ENVIRONMENT THAN I HAD EXPECTED. MEMBERS OF THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS INDICATED TO ME THAT, COMPARED WITH MOST OF LAST YEAR, THERE IS INDEED LESS FEAR OF ARBITRARY VIOLENCE IN THE SOCIETY AND LESS OBVIOUS SUSPICION AND SURVEILLANCE OF FOREIGNERS. A CURFEW REMAINS IN EFFECT FROM MIDNIGHT TO 6 AM. I BELIEVE THERE IS A SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNT OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE-TYPE INFORMATION THAT CAN BE ACQUIRED ON-THE-SPOT SIMPLY BY EYEBALL OBSERVATION AND NORMAL CONVERSATION WITH DIPLOMATIC CORPS REPRESENTATIVES, MEMBERS OF THE FIVE OR SIX INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS NOW ESTABLISHED IN LUANDA, REPRESENTATIVES OF AMERICAN AND OTHER BUSINESSES, ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, ETC. I WOULD SUGGEST THAT THE DEPARTMENT MAY WISH TO CONSIDER PERIODIC INFORMATION-GATHERING VISITS TO LUANDA. ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT PERMISSION OF COURSE WOULD BE REQUIRED. IT MIGHT OR MIGHT NOT BE GRANTED. ANGOLAN CONCURRENCE MIGHT BE MORE READILY OBTAINED IF A VISIT WERE TIED, AS IS THE CASE OF OUR CONTACT GROUP MISSION ON NAMIBIA, TO A SPECIFIC ISSUE ON WHICH WE WISHED TO OBTAIN ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT VIEWS. IT WOULD THEN BE RELATIVELY EASY TO ARRANGE FOR SEVERAL ADDITIONAL DAYS OF INNOCENT OBSERVATION OF THE LOCAL SCENE.

15. MAPS.
EMBASSY WOULD FIND VERY USEFUL WHATEVER MAPS OF ANGOLA AND NAMIBIA MAY BE READILY AVAILABLE.

16. END-USER EVALUATION.

WOULD APPRECIATE END-USER COMMENTS ON THIS MESSAGE. APOLOGIES FOR
LENGTH. DIFFICULT TO DISTINGUISH FROM HERE WHAT MAY BE TRIVIAL
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OR OBVIOUS AND WHAT MAY BE NEWS.
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Message Attributes

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Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: REPORT FROM LUANDA: FOUR DAYS IN FEBUARY SUMMARY: FOLLOWING ARE SUMMARY OBSERVATIONS FROM A FOUR-DAY VISIT TO LUANDA IN EARLY FEBRUARY. THE MPLA WOU LD COLLAP
TAGS: PFOR, PINT, MASS, AO, US, CU, MPLA, UNITA
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/708147d5-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
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